



Defining ideas in legal  discourse has  become so commonplace that  one 
might mistake it for a rule. The practice has its advantages. It is often said 
that  knowledge  is  gained  when  we  render  reality  more  intelligible  by 
seeking  generalisations  of  empirical  validity,  while  remaining  alert  to 
unique and deviant phenomena.1 But often, instead of marking out fields of 
enquiry,  definitions  tend  to  foreclose  arguments,  enabling  enquirers  to 
exclude from their enquiry everything else but that which would facilitate 
their arguments in reaching a general conclusion. Without building into the 
definition exercise safeguards that oppose this risk, the process of defining 
can  initiate  in  legal  discourse  and  elsewhere  violence  that  limits  our 
understanding of the same ideas that we seek to examine. The argument 
being made here  is  not  that  there  is  some intrinsic  virtue  in  theoretical 
pluralism, but  that  in acknowledging that  we live in  a theoretically and 
socially  dynamic  and  complex  world,  we  also  acknowledge  that 
definitional  exercises’  main  assumption  that  a  single  perspective  could 
adequately and comprehensively explain all the characteristics of life, as 
well as monitor and account for relevant changes as and when they occur, 
is  fraught  with  difficulty.  Pluralism  alerts  us  to  the  dangers  of  over-
simplification and the culture of violence enthroned through foundationalist 
philosophy,  which  lavishly  indulges  the  definitional  exercise.  Pluralism 
guards against the hazards of “… intellectual knockouts, - those attempts to 
disown past methodologies and theories on the assumption that they are 
entirely wrong, only to replace them with a new orthodoxy”.2 Therefore, 
indulging  in  the  definitional  exercise,  at  the  start  of  an  exercise  that 
examines the textual clarity and factual determinacy of custom, would be 
wholly counter-productive. 
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Of definitions, Elam writes that: 
…often they work on the basis of consensus or general agreement as to 
what words or phrases mean, limits must necessarily be imposed to fix the 
definition in either synchronic or diachronic terms. However necessary 
this process is for everyday communication, the danger of thinking you 
know it all is at no time greater than when it comes to grasping hold of 
definitions. Definitions threaten to function like final answers which erase 
the fact that there were ever any questions asked in the first place; their 
status  becomes  unshakable,  almost  natural,  and  rarely,  if  ever 
interrogated.3 
Besides the common problems associated with the definitional exercise, the 
language we rely on to couch definitions is almost always encumbered by 
inflections that appear unshakeable. Feminism, for instance, is a thematic 
criticism, consisting of a variety of inflections. For some, feminism means 
equal  pay,  abortion  rights,  and  a  partnership in  a  law firm.  For  others, 
feminism means a celebration of women as separate and distinct from men. 
To  others  still,  feminism  is  a  subversive  ideology  used  to  undermine 
authority  and  create  alternative  power  structures.4 The  pursuit  for 
definitions can, if not checked, enslave the enquirer who must then stick to 
the definitions s/he has suggested for her/his study rather than investigate 
each lead that  is  thrown up by her/his  search.  Consequently,  invaluable 
research energy may be sapped unwittingly by an unconscious effort  to 
justify  definitions.  For  these  reasons,  no  definition  of  deconstruction  is 
offered here. Again because of the thematic nature of deconstruction, it is 
not possible to indulge in the definition of it without immediately locking 
ourselves  into  uneasy  disputes  because  deconstruction  means  different 
things to different writers. It has been taken by some to mean “trashing”,5 
or “stinging criticism”6 and by others “the philosophy of the limit”,7 or “the 
philosophy of redemption”.8 As a means of textual analysis it is imbedded 
in philosophical ideas that involve the teasing out of hidden antinomies in 
the language that we use to represent ideas. For instance, article 38(1)(b) of 
the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice9 is  a  linguistic 
representation of legal custom. But by their very nature, ideas cannot be 
brought into the present. They are physically inaccessible, except through 
representation by some other medium. In spite of attempts to represent any 
idea by any medium, most commonly language, the idea remains in the 
background. According to Derrida, the traditional view is that that which is 
signified is inseparable from the signifier,  and that the signified and the 
signifier  are  the  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same  production.10 Because 
language comprises  symbols  deliberately  fashioned to  stand in  place  of 
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ideas and objects, it is vital to ask whether, and to what extent language as 
a series of symbols of representation of thought and objects successfully 
represents ideas and thoughts that it  is assigned to.  This is particularly 
important for lawyers because: 
The law is a profession of words; language is its stock-in-trade. … Most 
lawyers rely on a simplistic “functional” understanding of language as a 
transparent medium for the transmission of ideas and instructions. [Yet]… 
in skilled hands, it is considered a force for clarity and certainty; [and] in 
untutored ones, it is a source of confusion and disruption.11 
Deconstruction attempts to account for a heterogeneous variety, what Sallis 
calls:  “…  A  manifold  of  non-logical  contradictions  and  discursive 
inequalities  of  all  sorts  that  continues  to  haunt  and  fissure  even  the 
successful development  of  philosophical  arguments  and  their  systematic 
exposition”.12 Deconstruction’s  relevance  to  ideas  like  custom  is  made 
imperative  by  Western  thought’s  reliance  on  foundationalist  philosophy 
which  tends to  deny,  oppress  and  exclude  opposites  of  preferred  ideas. 
However,  this  is  not  entirely  possible  because  traces  of  the  ostracised 
opposites form an essential part of the character of the accepted idea. To 
borrow from Sallis, all major philosophical concepts - being, essence, the 
good,  the  One,  truth,  logos,  custom,  etc.  are  values  of  unbreachable 
plenitude and presence. 
Yet, concepts are not point-like simplicities, because in order to be what 
they are, they must be demarcated from other concepts to which they thus 
incessantly refer. In addition to such referentiality to other concepts with 
which  they  form  binary  oppositions,  they  are,  moreover,  caught  in 
systems and conceptual chains.13 
Derrida argues that no element can function, as a sign without referring to 
another element which itself is not simply present. This applies to spoken 
and written discourse.14 Therefore, the conceptual homogeneity sought in 
the formation of the concept of legal custom for instance is contradicted in 
a certain manner, by custom’s constitutive relation to other concepts. Even 
more,  it  is  contradicted  by  the  constitutive  relationship  of  customary 
international law’s formal attributes of State practice and  opinio juris to 
other concepts. Sallis writes that conceptual inconsistencies that result from 
a concept’s textual arrangement are complex, and comprise a heterogeneity 
of possibilities. These range from “… lexicological inconsistencies owing 
to multiple and variegated uses of one key word, signification, theme, or 
even signifier”.15 An example is when the function in the process of custom 
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of  a  resolution  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  is  variably 
associated with evidence of State practice and opinio juris and sometimes 
as  evidence  of  both  regardless  of  the  fact  that  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  resolutions  were  not  originally  intended  to  have  binding 
consequences on member States. Discrepancies between a preface, in this 
case article 38(1)(b) and the main text, in this case norms of customary 
international law can result in the same lexicological inconsistencies that 
lead to conceptual inconsistencies in the process of concept formation if in 
the  philosopher’s  eye  there  is  no  evidence  of  unity,  coherence,  and 
wholeness  of  the  philosophical  discourse.  These  lexicological 
inconsistencies abound in the formal source of customary international law, 
article  38(1)(b).16 In  a  complicated  active  and  passive  fashion,  they 
contribute  to  the  philosophical  discourse  on  the  theory  of  customary 
international  law.  To  enhance  customary  international  law’s  coherence, 
textual clarity, and determinacy these lexicological inconsistencies in the 
formulation  of  the  concept  of  customary  international  law  must  be 
attended. 
Deconstruction  seeks  to  account  for  these  constitutive 
contradictions  first  by destabilising the  false  prisms on which ideas  are 
anchored.  This  provides  for  the  exciting  opportunity  to  realise  what 
Theneuissen  calls:  “communicative  freedom”,  where  “…  one  part 
experiences  the  other  not  as  boundary  but  as  the  condition for  its  own 
generalisation”.17 As an example, foundationalist philosophy holds that the 
idea of science is discernible because of its exclusivity to superstition. This 
paradigm enables and leads to the creation of patterns for the mutual co-
determination of distinctively separate ideas. It enables the argument that 
customary international law is separate and distinct from treaty. As we have 
already  seen  in  Chapter  One,  there  is  evidence  that  primary  rules  of 
customary international law can result from the treaty process, and also that 
treaty rules sometimes reflect a codification of existing primary rules of 
customary  international  law.18 Therefore,  the  two  processes  of  norm 
creation  appear  to  be  mutually  supportive  and  not  -  as  foundationalist 
philosophy appears to  encourage -  mutually  exclusive and distinct  from 
each other. Deconstruction insists that instead of perceiving “A” and “B” 
as a pair of independent co-determinant ideas it is possible to show that the 
relata  are  internally  related  “…  first  negatively,  in  their  contrastive 
relationship with that which yields their self-definition, and then positively, 
as the belonging together in and through which the relata become what they 
are”.19 One  consequence  of  applying  foundationalist  philosophy 
unquestioningly appears to be that the syllogisms inherent in our strategies 
exclude a whole range of pertinent issues. One result of this is that concepts 
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deficient in coherence and difficult to sustain are created. Article 38(1)(b) 
appears to be an example of this.20
It  appears  that  by  over-emphasising  the  representational 
capabilities of language to thought, foundationalist philosophy has not only 
“mystified” language, but also successfully fuelled the campaign for the 
idea that language and thought are the same. This is an idea which, whether 
we want to acknowledge it or not, appears to typify Western legal discourse 
on  custom.  One  consequence  of  the  polarising  of  differences  between 
language and thought appears to be the creation of ideas whose viability is 
inherently assumed by the creative process. Of representation, Baudrillard21 
writes that it  “… starts from the principle that the sign and the real are 
equivalent (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom)”. 
However, Gutting’s22 analysis of Foucault’s commentary on the history of 
language in Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason shows this 
not to be the case. In what he calls the Renaissance episteme,23 knowledge, 
which according to Foucault is ultimately grounded on “order”,24 appeared 
to depend on the physical resemblance of one thing to another. Therefore 
Renaissance  thought  ordered  the  world  in  terms  of  relations  of 
resemblance.  But  how  were  the  knowledge  claims  of  this  episteme 
formulated? By what signs, and on what grounds? It is the linguistic signs 
that  received  the  highest  status  in  the  task  of  formulating  knowledge.25 
Foucault concludes that Renaissance episteme shows that language was:
A part  of  the  world  itself,  one  segment  of  the  complexly  intertwined 
system of resemblances. ...[It] was studied ... in the same way as a natural 
object.  Further,  since  language  was  assimilated  to  the  enduring  marks 
(signatures) found on physical objects, priority was given to its written 
form.26 
This privileging of written language over spoken language had a profound 
effect  on knowledge gathering for  the  reason that  it  did  not  distinguish 
between what was seen from what was read, and between directly observed 
facts from what might possibly fit as unreliable reporting. Fables, reported 
quotations,  exact  description,  and  commentary  were  all  inextricably 
mixed.27 For this reason, the value of information relating to myths and that 
relating  to  direct  observations  like  descriptions  of  a  thunderstorm  for 
instance was difficult to discern. The question whether these categories of 
information  had  the  same  status  in  the  ordering  of  knowledge  or  not 
appears to have been bypassed. Consequently, the Renaissance episteme’s 
conception of knowledge is one that places magic, erudition, and science at 
par.28 
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In  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century the  Classical  episteme 
emerged in Western thought, and replaced the Renaissance episteme. The 
Classical  episteme ordered  things,  not  just  by  their  resemblance  one  to 
another,  but  by  their  relations  of  identity  and  difference.  While  the 
resemblance of things remained the starting point of acquiring knowledge, 
resemblance was no longer regarded as expressing the true order of reality. 
Reality  was  ordered  and  understood  by  the  process  of  analysing  the 
structure of elements into which things their resemblance belonged. Strict 
identities and differences marked by the presence or absence of particular 
properties established those resemblances that gave birth to knowledge. On 
the basis  of  this  knowledge things  could be ordered,  for  example,  from 
simplest  to most complex.29 Therefore,  knowledge was no longer: “… a 
matter of recognising resemblances, but of extracting from resemblances 
precise  comparisons  of  the  identities  and  differences  of  things’ 
properties”.30 Unlike  the  preceding  episteme,  the  Classical  episteme 
regarded the analysis of resemblances, and not just their mere recognition, 
as the birth of knowledge.  No resemblances were accorded cognitive value 
prior to their interrogation, and the realisation through such interrogation, 
of their comparable identity and differences. Consequently, “… the mind’s 
essential activity in knowing was no longer to draw things together on the 
basis  of  their  resemblances  but  to  separate  them on  the  basis  of  their 
differences”.31 Unlike  Renaissance  knowledge  which  appeared  at  best 
probable,  Classical  knowledge  was  in  principle  capable  of  attaining 
certitude. 
Because  of  its  somewhat  robust  approach  to  the  conception  of 
knowledge the Classical  episteme inflicted profound change first  on the 
conception of language itself, and secondly on the use of language. Unlike 
the Renaissance order which regarded a signifier as a part of the world, and 
therefore  antecedent  to  man,  and  therefore  up  to  man  to  discover,  the 
Classical order held that a signifier exists as such only to the mind that 
knows. Unlike the Renaissance order, the Classical order held that no such 
mute and unknown signs existed. An immediate result of this conception of 
order was that the locus of signs shifted from the world, to the mind.32 The 
status  of  language  fell  from  being  an  object  of  creation,  to  being  the 
product of human construction. Because language’s function in ordering 
things now belonged to the realm of analysis,  it  served to separate and 
disperse, rather than to draw things together. Nonetheless,  language was 
also both the product of the analytic exercise, and the function of it. While 
it may be correct to say that the status of language was therefore demoted 
during the Classical episteme, there is also a sense in which it was elevated. 
It no longer belonged to that group of natural signs which are “… awkward 
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and inconvenient because they typically do not fit  easily and effectively 
into the mind’s workings”,33 but in the mind. Language ceased to be natural, 
and became conventional.  Conventional  signs  are  both a blessing and a 
curse.  A  blessing  in  the  sense  that,  arbitrarily,  we  have  the  power  to 
construct them, but a curse in the sense that our constructions are limited by 
the functions we need them to perform.34 Perhaps the crucial question to ask 
at this point is how conventional language signifies the real world today. 
Foucault thought that Classical signs were ontologically separated 
from  the  world  and  existed  in  an  ideal  mental  order.  Because  of  this 
separation “… Classical  signs  as  such  are  directly  related  to  what  they 
signify, without any intermediary such as resemblance to the signified”.35 
The question that tormented the Renaissance order: how is it possible to 
know that a sign did in fact designate what it signified? translated during 
the Classical order into the question: how can a sign be linked to what it 
signifies?36 It  is  here  that  any  excitement  with  conventional  signals 
succumbs  to  difficult  realities;  and  the  assumptions  about  conventional 
language  which  foundationalist  philosophy  might  have  engineered  are 
exposed  for  what  they  are,  i.e.  self-serving  tools  of  foundationalist 
philosophy. It appears that for this reason foundationalist philosophy has 
mystified language’s role first in the way knowledge is gained and ordered, 
and second in the way that knowledge is understood and applied. For this 
reason  language  should  be  the  first  obvious  site  of  contest  for  any 
deconstruction exercise. The validity of the most common assumptions we 
make about language, thought, and idea must succumb to scrutiny. 
This brings us to the assessment of the relationship between “idea”, 
and  “form”.  Are  these  two  equivalent  to  each  other,  or  distinctively 
separate? Cornell’s suggestion, with which this writer agrees, is that the 
“truth”  lies  in  the  confrontation  and  non-identity  between  concept  and 
object. She writes that: 
The “truth” is not to be found in the object, nor in the form of thought of 
the object,  nor  in  the  unity  of  subject  and object  in  the Concept.  The 
object can neither be grasped in its entirety by the concept nor can it be 
known in its immediacy.37 
A similar view is expressed by Rosenfield who writes that, “.. a text is not 
pure presence that immediately and transparently reveals a distinct meaning 
intended by its author”.38 The difficult English case of Regina v. Bentley39 is 
instructive of the problems we create for ourselves in legal discourse when 
we take for granted the relationship between “ideas” and their “forms”. 
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In that case, Bentley, then 19 years of age, was convicted, together 
with  Christopher  Craig,  at  the  Central  Criminal  Court  on  11 December 
1952 before Lord Goddard C.J., of the murder of P.C. Sidney George Miles 
at Croydon on 2 November 1952. He was sentenced to death. Craig was 
also found guilty of murder, but being only 16 years of age, he could not be 
sentenced to death. Despite widespread protests, and against the advice of 
civil servants, the Home Secretary refused to reprieve Bentley, who was 
hanged on 28 January 1953. The facts of the case are more intriguing than 
the summary above. 
The Crown had alleged that  during the evening of 2  November 
1952, a married woman saw Bentley and Craig climbing over a gate at the 
side  of  a  confectionery  warehouse  in  West  Croydon.  She  informed the 
police. By the time they reached the scene, Bentley and Craig had climbed 
onto the roof of the warehouse. One of the police officers followed them up 
onto  the  roof  via  a  drainpipe.  He  saw  Bentley  and  Craig  almost 
immediately. He walked towards them. They backed away and went behind 
a brickstack. When about six feet away, the officer shouted out, “I am a 
police officer. Come out from behind that stack”. Craig shouted back that if 
he wanted them he would have to come and get them. The policeman then 
rushed  behind  the  stack and seized  hold  of  Bentley.  He pulled Bentley 
round the stack with a view to closing in on Craig. In this drama, Craig 
drew  a  colt  pistol  which  he  held  towards  the  policeman.  Bentley 
instantaneously  squeezed  himself  out  of  the  policeman’s  grip,  shouting: 
“Let him have it Chris”. There was then a flash and a loud report. A bullet 
hit P.C. Fairfax on his right shoulder, making him spin round and fall to the 
ground.  Meanwhile,  P.C.  Miles  and  others  reached  the  roof  by  another 
route. P.C. Miles confronted Craig, who shot at him, hitting him between 
the  eyes.  P.C.  Miles  dropped  dead.  It  was  also  recorded  that  although 
Bentley was then 19 years of age, his mental state was reported to be: “Just 
above the level of a feebleminded person”.
This is not the place to indulge in the nuances of English criminal 
law on the circumstances importing culpability to accomplices in criminal 
acts. Suffice it to say that Bentley was no more than an accomplice to the 
murder of P.C. Miles. To link Bentley to the murder beyond all reasonable 
doubt,  the  Crown  invoked  his  statement  while  on  the  roof  of  the 
warehouse: “Let him have it Chris”, a phrase that has titled a film, a novel, 
and several reports on this case. The Crown insisted he meant: “Gun him 
down  Craig!”  The  defence  argued  very  persuasively,  and  almost 
successfully (judging by the public protests that followed both Bentley’s 
conviction,  and his  hanging),  that  by:  “Let  him have it  Chris”,  Bentley 
meant  no  more  than  that  Chris  should  surrender  the  colt  pistol  to  the 
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policeman.  It  was  argued  that  after  Craig  fired  his  first  two shots,  and 
before the intervention of P.C. Miles and the other police officers, Bentley 
who was on one side of the roof with P.C. Fairfax had expressed concern at 
the police officer’s plan to try and work his way to the fire escape because: 
“He (Chris) will shoot you”. What did Bentley mean by: “Let him have it 
Chris?” The day after Bentley was convicted, Lord Goddard C.J. (then trial 
judge), wrote to the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, and 
stated:
I regret to say I could find no mitigating circumstances in Bentley’s case. 
He was armed with a knuckle-duster of the most formidable type that I 
have ever seen and also with a sharp pointed knife and he called out to 
Craig when he was arrested to start the shooting.40
The campaign for Bentley’s posthumous pardon (which was finally granted 
in  199441)  always  insisted  that  by:  “Let  him  have  it  Chris”,  Bentley 
signalled the end of his involvement with Craig’s criminal endeavours. It 
seems that if Bentley was guilty of only one thing, it was not the murder of 
the Police Constable, but using ambiguous language. The meaning of the 
statement: “Let him have it Chris!” in its context is open to interpretation. 
There is therefore a sense in which the cues applied by any one 
listener to receive a statement influence the meaning s/he derives. So when 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  remarked  in  the  House  of  Commons  that: 
“Everyone  needs  a  Willie  in  life”,  she  understandably  would  not  have 
intended no more than to make a generous compliment to her then deputy 
prime minister  - Willie Whitelaw.42 The laughter that immediately united 
both sides of the House showed instead that Mrs Thatcher had made the 
joke of her political career because colloquially speaking, a “willie” is a 
penis. 
In  interrogating  article  38(1)(b)  for  obscurities  that  hinder  the 
legitimacy43 of  customary  international  law  two  questions  must  take 
priority. The first refers to the content that international tribunals attach to 
the requirements of State practice and  opinio juris.  If  State practice and 
opinio juris  are  the  shells  of  customary international  law,  what  content 
must international tribunals find in those shells before it can declare the 
emergence of a new rule of customary international law? The second refers 
to the consistent, clear and coherent application of those requirements by 
international tribunals in each case. Is there an enduring insistence on the 
presence in the shells of customary international law of the same content, in 
all cases, for the inauguration of a rules of customary international law? 
Perhaps it is to these attributes of interpretation more than anything else 
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that  we  have  to  look  in  order  to  isolate  the  confusion  surrounding 
customary  international  law  before  we  can  attempt  to  reformulate  it. 
Deconstruction,44 with  its  insistence  on  accounting  for  dissimilarities  in 
binary oppositions inherent in foundationalist philosophy, appears a good 
candidate for this task.
Deconstruction
In  Dissemination, Derrida does two important things. First, he shows that 
the sacrificial origins of philosophy are formal and substantial, as well as 
textual and institutional. Second, he traces the inculcation of the sacrificial 
logocentric bias of Western Philosophy into Platonism.45 In Phaedrus Plato 
recounts the myth of Theuth, in which writing as a form of a gift that can 
aid  one’s  memory  is  presented  to  Ra,46 the  father-god,  who  refuses  it 
because he perceives it to be a  dangerous drug that impedes the memory 
and therefore usurps the active functioning of the brain. Says the King: 
If men learn this,  it  will  implant forgetfulness in their  souls;  they will 
cease  to  exercise  memory because  they  rely  on that  which  is  written, 
calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by 
means of external marks.
Plato  calls  writing  pharmakon,  by  which  he  means  a  remedy-poison.47 
Derrida argues that because writing is perceived as a supplement to speech, 
to presence of mind, to the origin as logos and logos as origin, and because 
it  is  expelled  for  threatening  to  supplant  it  altogether,  the  rejection  by 
philosophic  tradition  of  a  radical  ambiguity  or  originary  bivalence  is 
exposed.48 This exposure appears to suggest that the violence of exclusion 
is imbedded in our philosophical traditions which for the stabilisation of 
concepts and ideas appear to  depend on a process of  radical  expulsion, 
exclusion and rejection of the  opposite idea:  the sacrifice.  Through this 
violence or sacrifice, order is established because the difference between 
the good idea that is kept and the bad idea that is sacrificed is established. 
Good and bad are just as distinct and as separate from each other as they 
sound in our ears. We must not suggest that even in the best of us, lies 
some evil, and in the worst of us, lies some good. No. The difference is 
obvious and beyond comparison. For Derrida, the central problem with this 
approach is that the very sacrifice that is excluded appears to be the matrix 
for  difference,  the  matrix  for  pluralism  and  the  matrix  for  unsifted 
knowledge.
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The pharmakon is the origin, the foundation of oppositions that come into 
being by its  expulsion.  Far  from being dominated by any oppositions, 
writing is the condition for the very possibility of opposition; it cannot be 
contained by any oppositions, but remains ever in excess of them. Writing 
is insubordinate in principle and, more importantly, of principle as such. 
The emergence of the logos as the condition of truth, of the presence of 
the idea itself, is thus traced to the expulsion of an otherness in which it 
originates.  ...  This  obstacle  to  truth,  the  rival  to  truth  is  likewise  its 
originary model. This opposition of same to same, where rival model, and 
obstacle  are  one,  displays  the  dynamics  of  violent  mimesis  of  the 
victimary hypothesis.49
This approach alienates violence from the community by protecting the 
community from its own violence. However, it also appears to mystify the 
origin of violence by assigning it to the victim. The result is that the same 
violence which must be eliminated is protected. Therefore, the community 
is ever in search of new victims in which it blindly seeks its “…store of 
deep background”.50 The ugliness of  this  violence lies  in that  often,  the 
privileged idea is applied to define or interpret its opposite, and we accept 
the outcome of that process as “rational”. For the purposes of this study, the 
question whether a better understanding of customary international law can 
be arrived at from a reconciliation of that which the process of formulating 
rules of customary international law has privileged as a rule of customary 
international law, and that which it has excluded as its other or opposite, 
takes priority. Derrida argues that the other is not merely the opposite of the 
privileged idea. To hold that view would be to perpetuate the violence that 
gives rise to the sort of interpretation and valuations that are coterminous 
with it. 
All  translations  into  languages  that  are  the  heirs  and  depositories  of 
Western metaphysics thus produce on the pharmakon an effect of analysis 
that  violently  destroys  it,  reduces  it  to  one  of  its  simple  elements  by  
interpreting  it,  paradoxically  enough,  in  the  light  of  the  ulterior  
developments it itself has made possible. Such an interpretative translation 
is thus as violent as it is impotent: it destroys the  pharmakon but at the 
same time forbids itself access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve.51
It has to be accepted that this approach to creating processes for concept 
formation and ideas in general is not entirely helpful, not least because of 
the imponderable paradoxes it infuses in the processes and concepts that 
result.52
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Derrida recommends application of reversal reasoning techniques 
to  test  the  strength  of  ideas  that  are  otherwise  regarded  as  “givens”.53 
Article  38(1)(b)  implies  that  norms  of  customary  international  law  are 
created when States deliberately behave in  a particular  fashion,  under a 
genuine belief that their conduct is obligated by law. This is the “the given 
position”  of  custom.  For  deconstruction,  this  must  raise  at  least  two 
questions. The first is whether the concept of customary international law 
as  formulated  in  article  38(1)(b),  and  as  interpreted  by  international 
tribunals, has escaped the trappings of foundationalist philosophy discussed 
above? The second is whether an interrogation of customary international 
law by  the  introduction  of  its  ostracised  “other”  to  the  equation  would 
require  a  radical  change  in  its  formulation?  Deconstruction  evidences 
several  themes,  including  inversion  of  hierarchies,  supplementing,  
examining free play of texts, and liberating texts from their authors. What 
follows is a brief attempt to introduce these themes. This involves a double 
play of signifiers by which is meant an attempt to signify that which is not 
present with reference to a previous attempt to signify it. This is a delicate 
process that calls for much humility. Derrida writes that in such a process: 
Not only do the signifier and the signified seem to unite, but also, in this 
confusion, the signifier seems to erase itself or to become transparent, in 
order  to  allow the  concept  to  present  itself  as  what  it  is,  referring  to 
nothing other than its presence.54 
In this instance, the task is complicated by the fact that Derrida’s writings 
have earned him not so much a reputation of being incomprehensible as 
being difficult.55 In places descriptions of deconstruction are so dense that 
direct quoting is inevitable if  one is  to uphold the account.  While these 
themes  are  described  here  separately,  in  practice,  they  overlap  and  are 
therefore better perceived as one body rather than distinct entities.
Inversion of Hierarchies
The inversion of hierarchies56 involves identifying hierarchical oppositions 
-  the  preferred  idea  “A”,  and  the  subservient  idea  “B”,  and  then 
immediately reversing the status of the ideas in the hierarchy. The quest 
here  is  simply  to  find  out  what  happens  when the  “given”  idea  or  the 
common sense scenario is  reversed. This process can unlock conceptual 
difficulties rooted in linguistic and other related signifiers, giving off fresh 
insights into knowledge of the sphere of operation of the particular binary 
opposition. Successful deconstruction of a hierarchical opposition reveals 
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that the property previously ascribed to “A” alone is also true of “B”, and 
vice versa. It shows that “A’s” privileged status is an illusion because “A” 
depends for its meaning upon “B” as much as “B” depends for its status on 
“A”. It reveals, then, that “B” stands in relation to “A” much like “A” stood 
in relation to “B”. Indeed, it is possible to find in the very reasons that “A” 
is privileged over “B” the reasons that “B” could equally be privileged over 
“A” - the  trace effect. Because both idea “A” and idea “B” rely for their 
coherence on the differentiation between each other,  idea “A” bears the 
traces of idea “B”, and idea “B” the traces of idea “A”. The trace is what 
makes deconstruction possible. By identifying the trace of the concepts in 
each other, their mutual conceptual dependence is revealed. Nonetheless, 
differance and trace are not stable conceptions. “They simply represent the 
play  of  differences  and  dependencies  between  two  mutually  opposed 
concepts. Neither could serve as a foundational concept”.57 Having reversed 
the  hierarchy,  it  is  possible  to  see  about  both  “A”  and  “B”  what  had 
hitherto been unnoticed.58 The Swiss linguist De Saussure’s work presents a 
vivid illustration of this point. Saussure thought that language depended on 
langue and parole. He privileged langue (the background system of rules) 
over  parole (the  set  of  speech  acts  made  by  members  of  a  linguistic 
community)  on the  grounds that  the rules governing a language form a 
system that literally creates the language itself. Parole, he argued, mirrored 
the workings of langue. Without the pre-existence of langue, parole would 
be impossible.59 A deconstruction of Saussure’s arguments initially presents 
the  chicken  and  egg argument  because the  question becomes:  How did 
language begin before the establishment of a system of rules that enabled 
its  users  to  distinguish  between  different  words,  and  acceptable  word 
patterns? Culler argues that if a cave dweller is successfully to inaugurate 
language by making a special grunt signifying “food”, we must suppose 
that the grunt is already distinguished from other grunts and that the world 
has already been divided into categories of “food” and “non-food”.60 It can 
be argued therefore that language could have begun with speech acts or 
parole, which over time were consolidated to create a linguistic system or 
langue. Balkin writes that:
Speech acts could not have been understood without some pre-existing 
structure  that  made  others  understand  that  certain  primordial  grunts 
signified: “This is a rock”, rather than “I am in pain”. No matter how far 
back we go, each speech act seems to require a pre-existing linguistic and 
semantic structure in order to be intelligible, but any such structure could 
not come into being without a history of pre-existing speech acts by past 
speakers. Neither langue nor parole could be a foundational concept in a 
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theory of language because each is mutually dependent upon the existence 
of the other.61
Therefore,  the  relationship  between  “A”  and  “B”  is  one  of  mutual 
dependence.  Derrida  coined  the  word  “differance” to  explain  the 
relationship  between  hierarchical  oppositions.  It  means  that  in  the 
hierarchy, each opposition defers the other in the sense of making the other 
wait for it; and each opposition defers to the other in the sense of being 
fundamentally dependent upon the other.62 
A  good  starting  point  for  deconstructing  custom  might  be  to 
analyse the relationship between State practice and opinio juris. Does this 
relationship typify an opposing hierarchy where the binary ideas ought to 
defer one to the other? (Let us call this scenario situation A). If so, what are 
the conditions under which such deference takes place, and how should 
customary international law’s secondary rules of recognition characterise 
this relationship?  Or does this relationship involve two alien ideas; alien in 
the sense that each of them has its other counterpart, over which it has been 
privileged,  and  that  this  privileging  was  based  on  the  logocentric  bias 
originating  from  foundationalist  philosophy?  (Let  us  call  this  scenario  
situation B). If so, could this be a main source of the confusion besetting 
the contemporary doctrine of custom? Can customary international law’s 
secondary rules of recognition be couched in such a way that they avoid 
this problem? Alternatively, do the problems with customary international 
law point to a very complex problem, where elements of “A” and “B” are 
present in different measures? (Let us call this scenario situation C).  If so, 
how should custom’s legitimacy deficiencies be addressed? Situation “C” 
may be described fairly as a desperate one, while situations “A” and “B” 
appear to be very attractive challenges. To discuss this issue under the three 
situations mentioned above is of course to over-simplify matters because 
neither of these situations exists in a vacuum. The context is affected also 
by  riddles  of  interactive  oppositions  affecting  the  situation.  But  this 
simplification is necessary for the consideration of the matter at hand.
If evidence of the existence of rules of customary international law 
depends so much on the coming together of the two limbs of custom, are 
the two limbs of customary international law - State practice and  opinio 
juris - so distinct from each other that evidence of the existence of the one 
only will not suffice to indicate existence of the other - the trace effect? In 
other words,  could we impute evidence of the existence of  one limb of 
custom from evidence of the existence of the other? If this were possible, 
would it  then  follow that  the  two limbs were  proximate  enough that  it 
would be a tautology to talk of two requirements of custom? If it were not 
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possible to impute the trace effect to the two limbs of custom, would it be 
correct  to  say  that  because  the  two  limbs  of  custom  share  no  mutual 
dependence  in  their  effort  to  describe  what  is  to  them  a  common 
phenomenon, they both have to be proven in each case that a new norm of 
customary international law is declared?
Supplement v. Metaphysics of Presence
The theme of supplement and metaphysics63 of presence alerts us to the 
danger  of  over-simplifying  the  relationship  between thought  on  the  one 
hand, and language on the other. This seems to be Derrida’s main point of 
contention with hermeneutics. Using the example of  writing and  speech, 
Derrida shows that the hermeneutics school insists on deciphering the truth 
shielded in a text. Its presumption is that beneath the textual surface lies a 
finished meaning or truth which has to be discovered, what Schrift64 calls a 
“transcendental signified”. The discovery of this truth freezes the text in a 
particular position. This fixing of textual position and settling on a thesis or 
truth is the biggest weakness of hermeneutics because for him, reading, and 
any reading for that matter, is a transformational activity which contends 
itself with the infinite play of the text’s surface. Derrida writes that: 
The writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, 
and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses 
them  only  by  letting  himself,  after  a  fashion  and  up  to  a  point,  be 
governed by the system. And the reading must always aim at a certain 
relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and 
what he does not command of the patterns of the language he uses.65 
At  the  very  least,  the  hermeneutic  approach  rests  on  two  suppositions 
which constitute a metaphysical backdrop. The first is that there is a tenable 
dichotomy between language and the empirical world, such that it makes 
sense to think of one as a description of the other. The second is that some 
such language can in principle be rendered as determinate as the world that 
it seeks to describe.66 However, the signifying activity of the sign always, 
by definition, exceeds the intention of the author. Therefore, reading should 
not merely aim at a re-production of that signifying intention.67 This is yet 
another distinction between Derrida and the hermeneutic school. Whereas 
the hermeneutics seek to re-produce the same text, with a view to finding or 
discovering  its  meaning,  deconstructive  reading  is  not  bound  by  the 
existence  of  such  a  meaning  of  the  text.  Instead  its  active  approach  to 
reading creates interaction between the reader and the writer, liberating, in 
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the process, the reader from a  transcendental signified,  so that s/he can 
interpret the possible meanings of the text.68  It is during this interaction 
with the text that the Deconstructionist supplements69 it. However, the word 
supplement has many meanings. It can mean something added to an already 
complete or self-sufficient thing, or something added to something lacking 
in order to complete it. The number plates we stick to the front and back of 
our cars are supplements in the latter sense because while cars could drive 
without  them, it  would be enormously difficult  to  identify  them on the 
public car park, or in the event of a theft, or an accident. In other words, we 
could not, without number-plates, use cars to achieve the convenience that 
they are created for without being greatly inconvenienced in the process. 
Number-plates enable us to identify our cars. The paint we choose for our 
car appears to be a supplement in the former sense because for functional 
purposes cars can drive without the layers of paint we dress them in. 
Derrida argues that writing can only supplement speech in the first 
sense, that is, as a representation of speech and not as having a shortcoming 
that could be fulfilled because speech is not the exact representation of the 
speaker made present, but aural symbols that represent thought. According 
to Derrida, speech appears to possess presence only because of the fortuity 
that people speak and think simultaneously.70 In this sense, writing can be 
compared to speech in that, like speech, it plays a mediatory function of 
signifying what it is not, and what it does not represent.71 Speech possesses 
therefore, the same weakness we observe in writing in that it is no more 
present than writing. Like writing it mediates something more present than 
itself - thought. Not even Roussea and Levi Strauss’ attempt, for their own 
purposes,  to  distinguish  the  two by identifying  speech  with  nature,  and 
writing with culture, can blur that fact.72 Speech, like writing, is therefore a 
supplement because  a  signifier supplements  that  which  it  signifies.  If 
speech supplements thought, then thought in itself must be lacking in that it 
depends in this way on speech or writing. Every  signified is in reality a 
signifier in  disguise,  and every  signifier only imperfectly  represents  the 
thing it  signifies.73 For this reason our impression of the world is nothing 
but a series of  signifiers of  signifiers of  signifiers,  ad infinitum reaching 
towards  an  unmediated,  complete,  self-sufficient  presence.  If  this  is 
acceptable,  then  it  must  be  acceptable  also  to  say  that  foundationalist 
philosophy promotes arbitrary limits of signification which themselves do 
not  sufficiently  signify  the  complete,  self-sufficient  presence.  For  this 
reason  uncritical  foundationalism  is  not  practical  in  the  exercise  of 
signifying law creating processes such as custom. Derrida advocates the 
abandonment of the philosophy of foundationalism with a description of 
what he regards as the ultimate deconstruction of presence. 
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There  is  nothing  outside  of  the  text  ...  [The  idea  of  “dangerous 
supplement” shows that] ... in what one calls ... real life.... there has never 
been  anything  but  supplements;  substitutive  significations  which  could 
only  come  forth  in  a  chain  of  differential  references  ...  the  absolute 
present, Nature, ... has always already escaped, has never existed ...74
If Derrida is right, the part of the answer to a legitimate doctrine of custom 
may lie in identifying the manner in which custom’s rules of recognition 
supplement the idea of customary international law? Do they supplement 
customary international law in the sense of completing an incomplete idea, 
or  merely  as  signifiers  ad  infinitum?75 Does  the  jurisprudence  of 
international  tribunals  on  custom  reflect  a  consistent  usage  of  that 
supplementing?  If  the  jurisprudence  shows  a  consistent  pattern  of 
supplementing, we should be concerned to discover the effect on custom of 
according variable importance to  the  supplements that  depict  customary 
international law where it can be shown that traces of those supplements 
are evident in the hierarchy of customary international law. 
Free Play of Text, Meaning and Interpretation
Evidence of  free  play76 of  texts  points  to  ambiguities  and risks  that  we 
expose ourselves to whenever we participate in the act of communicating, 
whatever the context. Language is not infinitely capable of harnessing and 
communicating  our  thoughts  as  we  assume,  yet  nearly  all  the  time  we 
attempt to communicate we appear to assume that thought and form will 
twine to achieve our goal. Bell and Cooper write that: 
Language often obscures the actual structure and nature of thought. Of 
course ... one could not think most of the thoughts one thinks except by 
means of language. ... Thus natural language is cast in the role of a villain 
on which one must perforce rely, both in order to think and as a source of 
clues  about  the  nature of  thought.  Nonetheless,  natural  language  is  an 
imperfect instrument for thought. And  ... only a language yet to be fully 
fashioned - a “perfect language” (one ideally suited to the expression of 
thought, especially a priori thought) - would express thought, and senses, 
in a perspicuous manner.77 
Frege  argues  that  the  sense  of  an  expression  is  not  clearly  or  sharply 
grasped even by the most competent users of it. In his own words: 
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What  is  known  as  the  history  of  concepts  is  a  history  either  of  our 
knowledge of  concepts  or  of  the  meanings of  words.  Often  it  is  only 
through great intellectual labour, which can continue over centuries, that a 
concept is known in its purity, and stripped of foreign covering that hid it 
from the eye of the intellect.78 
Foucault  writes  that  because  of  the  decline  of  representation,  and  the 
consequent fragmentation of knowledge in the last few centuries, language 
has lost the central place it occupied in the Classical episteme. “Language 
is now itself just one object of knowledge among others”.79 However, in 
spite  of  this  demotion  in  status,  language  remains  the  medium through 
which any knowledge must be expressed. Mandela writes that: 
Without language, one cannot talk to people and understand them; one 
cannot share their hopes and aspirations, grasp their history, appreciate 
their poetry or savour their songs.80 
The  difficulty  with  using  language,  stems  from  the  fact  that  language 
cannot be reduced entirely to an object because:
It always reappears in the subject’s effort to express what he knows. ... 
our use of language burdens us with meanings and presuppositions that 
confuse and distort what we are trying to say. We express our thoughts in 
words of which we are not the masters.81 
The foregoing statements on language appear to make the case that 
it is necessary to adapt our thinking habits so that they reflect the problems 
the use of language imposes on us. In turn this should enable us to effect in 
the legal language we create for legal discourse, the necessary safeguards 
that  limit  the  risk of  confusion that  is  inimical  to  the legitimacy of the 
processes of law we create. A close examination of the philosophical basis 
for the assumption that a legal language consistent with the “reality out 
there” is possible, soon leads us to the gates of empiricism.82 Nonetheless, 
the  success  of  empirical  science  proved  difficult,  especially  for  social 
scientists, because there was no tenable dichotomy between language and 
the  empirical  world.  Sacks  observes  that  the  philosopher  found himself 
redundant. “Rather than opposing or evaluating the scientific enterprise, or 
extending it into new fields, analytic philosophy accepted natural science as 
paradigmatic.”83 In a sense,  language became the lens to the world, and 
philosophers and scientists alike disinclined themselves from spending too 
much time on the dark side of the lens, intent on seeing the world through 
it. This is neatly summarised in Johnson’s declaration that, “Language is 
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the dress of thought”.84 The question that hardly surfaced was whether there 
were blind spots in the lens – language, and what effect this might have on 
this important tool. The benefit of deconstruction to the lawyer is summed 
up  by  its  insistence  on  asking  the  formerly  unasked  question. 
Deconstruction focuses on the means by which we consider the real and the 
abstract, or the state of things generally through language. Derrida argues 
that often our use of language reveals that we mean more than we say, and 
also often say more than we mean. Derrida calls this curious habit of words 
bursting the seams of our subjective intentions and producing their own 
kind of logic the free play of texts.85  The implication is that language as a 
means of considering contexts is not as reliable a tool as our casual and 
unquestioning use of it suggests. The impressions language portrays cannot 
be relied upon all the time. Sacks writes that:
Language - must be suitably sensitive for the task. Primarily, language 
must be such as not to contain any blind spots. It must not contain any 
ineliminable vagueness. For any point, at which language is ineliminably 
vague, is thereby a point at which the full determinateness of the world 
goes unfathomed, unmapped. The requirement is that language comes as 
close as possible to being as free of vagueness as the world towards which 
our  inquiry  -  couched  in  terms  of  it  -  is  directed.  If  language  is  the 
instrument by means of which we tackle the world, it must be shown to be 
as fine an implement as the delicate job at hand requires.86 
The confusion surrounding customary international law may be adduced as 
evidence  that  there  are  blind  spots  in  its  formulation,  and  in  the 
interpretation  of  that  formulation.  These  blind  spots  threaten  the 
determinacy,  coherence and legitimacy87 of  customary  international  law. 
One question this study cannot avoid is whether there is evidence of  free 
play of text in the language of custom. If the answer to the former question 
is in the positive, a question that follows it is this: to what extent does this 
free play of text threaten the legitimacy of customary international law? 
Language signifies bits of the world as phrases and sentences. It is 
sentences alone that have the burden of depicting what we regard as fact. 
Sentences are therefore the units of significance. Sacks writes that:
The meaning of the individual word consists in the contribution it makes to the 
sentences in which it can occur. Sentences are either true or false. And it seems 
clear that if those units of significance are to be either true or false, they must have 
determinate  meaning.  Were  a  sentence  to  prove  incomplete  as  the  bearer  of 
content,  completeness  requiring  some  additional  element,  then  accordingly  the 
sentence on its own - without that additional complementary element - would not 
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have a determinate truth value.  The sentence would then be true,  or  false only 
relative to that additional element, whatever that may be.88
For this very reason, what we did not intend to say is as important for the 
deconstructionist as what we actually said. According to Derrida, when we 
create sentences, the naturality of the exercise hardly awakens us to the fact 
that we might be saying more or less than what we intend.89 However, our 
speech and writing often perform tricks that we had not envisaged, creating 
meanings that we had not intended, leading to conclusions that were not in 
our minds when we wrote or spoke. This has serious implications for any 
doctrine of law. In part, this study will address the question whether the 
free play of the text of article 38(1)(b) has contributed to the perceived 
legitimacy deficiencies in customary international law.90 Is the intention of 
the drafters of article 38(1)(b) reflected in international tribunals’ practice 
on the matter? Are the  travaux preparatoires on article 38(1)(b),  article 
38(1)(b)  itself,  and  international  tribunals’  jurisprudence  on  customary 
international law united on what constitutes customary international law? 
Or has the free play of article 38(1)(b) resulted in a misrepresentation of the 
1920  Committee  of  Jurists’  idea  of  customary  international  law?  91 An 
enquiry into this question may well identify the blind spots in the lens of 
customary international law.
The foregoing discussion shows that words are not, and should not 
be  regarded  as,  passive  instruments  for  communication,  but  as  active 
instruments capable of surprising even their most eloquent master. It is for 
this reason that much of deconstructive criticism targets the discovery of 
unintended connections between words, phrases, and passages put together 
to signify a  particular  thought  or  idea.  The benefit  of  establishing such 
connections is twofold. The first is that the author’s apparent ideas easily 
can  be  isolated  and  crystallised.  The  second  is  that  it  enables  the 
challenging of the logocentric bias that the most important meanings in a 
text are those that are apparent.92 In a legal text, discovery of unintended 
meanings can have one of two effects. It might reveal the inconsistencies 
underlying the author’s rationale. It might also strengthen the apparent and 
intended meaning  of  the  author  by  extending  the  application  of  his/her 
ideas beyond his/her intentions. The latter effect serves therefore to justify 
the effectiveness of the author’s thoughts.   In this sense,  deconstruction 
attends the void between what “ … the author wishes to achieve by his or 
her language, and what the language actually achieves for him/her”.93 No 
one that uses language as a means of communication can pretend that this 
void is  not  a  part  of  their  life,  not  least  lawyers,  who spend their  time 
Deconstructionism, Normative Theory and Custom  138
creating,  analysing  and  utilising  texts.  This  brings  us  to  the  question 
whether we have any remedies to limit or control the free play of texts? 
Controlling Text’s Free Play 
Our ability  to  control  or  to  limit  the  free  play of  texts  depends  on the 
iterability of  the  signifiers in  them  as  well  as  the  iterability of  the 
combination of signifiers. Iterability refers to a signifier’s ability to signify 
repeatedly in a number of different contexts. According to Derrida,94 we 
benefit from using signs if, and only if, they are separable from our intent; 
and if, and only if, they mean, whether we intend it or not, what they mean. 
In this sense, language can signify only if it can escape the actual present 
meaning it had to the person who used it. This requirement implies that for 
the requirements of  opinio juris, and State practice to enhance customary 
international law’s legitimacy, they themselves must be unmistakeable. At 
the very least, the number of things that come under opinio juris must be 
unmistakeable. However, if the practice of international tribunals regards 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions variably as evidence of State 
practice  and  as  evidence  of  opinio  juris,  or  both,  then  their  iterability 
becomes  incommensurate.  Incommensurate signifiers  are  not  useful  for 
communication, let alone, for a doctrine of law. Yet international tribunals 
are  encouraged  to  have  regard  to  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
resolutions in their determination of the question whether a new norm of 
customary  international  law  has  been  created.  United  Nations  General 
Assembly resolution 3232 (XXIX) of 12 November 1974, stresses that in 
view of the increasing development and codification of international law in 
conventions open for universal participation and the consequent need for 
their uniform interpretation and application, it should be widely accepted 
that the development of international law may be reflected,  inter alia, by 
declarations  and  resolutions  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
which  may,  to  that  extent,  be  taken  into  consideration  by  international 
tribunals.95 The value of this recommendation is dubious because the United 
Nations cannot create binding rules except when the Security Council takes 
decisions  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  Its  other 
principal  organs,  including  the  General  Assembly,  have  no  authority  to 
make  binding  decisions  except  in  administrative  and budgetary matters. 
During the drafting of the United Nations Charter, attempts to mandate the 
General Assembly to create rules automatically binding on member States 
were vigorously rejected. The ILC writes that:
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The governments participating in the drafting of the Charter of the United 
Nations  were  overwhelmingly  opposed  to  conferring  on  the  United 
Nations legislative power to enact binding rules of international law. As a 
corollary, they also rejected proposals to confer on the General Assembly 
the power to impose certain general conventions on States by some form 
of majority vote.96
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter shows that in the end, 
the General Assembly was authorised in this regard, only to “… initiate 
studies and make recommendations” for  the purpose of  encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification. It seems 
that of all the resolutions of the General Assembly, resolution 3232 is most 
troubling in that it  shows the General Assembly, contrary to the United 
Nations Charter, bestowing upon itself authority which the founding States 
had earlier on deliberately denied it. If international tribunals have followed 
on  from  this  and  regarded  General  Assembly  resolutions  as  potential 
signifiers of either opinio juris or State practice, then some of the confusion 
exercising customary international law might  be said to result  from this 
resort to  uniterable signifiers.97 This is borne out by the fact that Western 
States  have  always  resisted  Third  World  States’  claims  that  General 
Assembly resolutions have any binding legal effect.98 Yet the practice of 
international tribunals seems to bear no regard to this fact at all. 
It  has to be borne in mind also that  iterability alters.  What this 
means  is  that  once  the  author  has  communicated,  the  communication 
assumes a life of its own, with the contexts in which it finds itself defining 
its meaning.99 This liberation of the text from its author is what imports into 
the application of language, the free play of the text.100  Could it be that the 
free play of the text of article 13 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter 
has already broken free from its intended purpose as set out in the travaux 
preparatoires  to  the  United  Nations  Charter,  and  created  a  meaning  or 
meanings which render General Assembly resolution 3232 significant to 
the process of custom? By its pronouncements in the South West Africa 
Case, the ICJ seems to have taken this view. It stated that:
It would not be correct to assume that because the General Assembly is in 
principle  vested  with  recommendatory  powers,  it  is  debarred  from 
adopting,  in  specific  cases  within  the  framework  of  its  competence, 
resolutions which make determinations or have operative design.101
Perhaps  this  is  what  Wilberforce  refers  to  as  “… the intelligent  use  of 
international processes and remedies ... against the continuous conditions of 
disturbance and hostility short  of  war...  in  which we live today...”,102 or 
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more precisely perhaps what Judge Elias refers to as “… a serious effort ... 
being  made  to  take  account  of  the  expanding  frontiers  of  international 
law?”103 Lee104 uses  the  term  opinio  communitatis,  to  describe  these 
developments. According to Lee,  opinio communitatis is realised through 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  resolutions  when  those  resolutions 
establish  what  rules  of  international  law  States  support  widely.105 
Brownlie106 writes  that  although  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
resolutions are prima facie incapable of creating legal obligation, there are 
special  circumstances  that  may  give  a  considerable  significance  to 
resolutions on legal questions. 
Thus they may be cogent evidence of State practice and opinio juris. In 
the face of a relatively novel situation, the General Assembly provides an 
efficient index to the quickly growing practice of States. 
Many writers107 point to the formation of instant customary international 
law via the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the use of outer 
space,  long before  the  Treaty on Principles  Governing the  Activities  of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, as evidence that General Assembly resolutions may 
be  adduced  as  evidence  of  the  emergence  of  a  rules  of  customary 
international law. The case to be made is that all these loose and seemingly 
contradictory ends of the process of custom need reconciling in order to 
liberate customary international law from the confusion that continues to 
threaten its legitimacy. 
Liberating a Text from its Author
Because iterability alters,108 and because the signifiers in a text are capable 
of  interacting  to  produce  a  meaning  not  previously  intended  or  even 
imagined by the author,109 it is only fitting that deconstruction also seeks to 
liberate texts from their authors. 110  The conclusion that reality is illusory 
because all we have is metaphors that represent other metaphors, and so 
on,111 must pose inescapable questions for lawyers particularly because they 
are greatly concerned with the interpretation of texts for the purpose of 
establishing  “the  rule  of  law”.  The  development  of  theories  on 
interpretation  of  legal  texts  seems  in  part  to  address  some  of  these 
questions. The teleological approach112 for example suggests that the reader 
should give effect to the intention of the author, and the purpose for which 
the  text  was  written.  Therefore  the  goal  of  interpretation  should  be  to 
understand the meaning of a text by grasping the author’s intention.  Its 
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underlying premise seems to be that accurate interpretation results in the 
actualisation of the author’s intent. Inaccurate interpretation on the other 
hand results in defiance of the author’s intention. Therefore, there is a sense 
in which the goal of all interpretation is to separate correct readings from 
misreadings.  The  importance  of  this  approach  to  the  legal  world  is 
emphasised by the importance attached to draft statutes, white papers, and 
travaux preparatoires  to conventions and treaties. But casual reliance on 
this approach may have given rise to some of the deficiencies attending 
customary international law today. What are lawyers looking for when they 
read  texts  over  and  over  again,  comparing  new  texts  with  old  ones, 
reviewing both old and new literature on a subject? They are seeking first 
to establish the rule of law, and further to assess the justiceability of that 
rule. This obsession with the rule of law may give rise to the privileging of 
one idea over its opposites. As lawyers review their materials and literature, 
they inevitably involve themselves in an endless spin of ideas, punctuated 
by a transitory crowning of one idea over its rivals, only to revisit the same 
site, to repeat the same process. A legal orthodoxy is created which denies 
that  the  privileged  ideas  have  opposites  without  which  they  would  not 
make sense at all. There is a sense in which this victimisation of the other, 
and the  enthronement of  the  privileged idea limits  understanding of  the 
ideas and concepts that apply in our legal systems. This happens so easily 
that the violence involved is hardly noticed, or if it is, it is easily passed. 
For a start, lawyers’ readings of texts are always partial in at least 
two ways. First, they are partial in that they represent only some aspects of 
the meaning of texts. Second, they are partial in that they are interpretations 
that benefit  the position they advocate. This second kind of partiality is 
very likely to lead to the first. It does not follow as a matter of course that 
what is today accepted as a correct reading or interpretation of a statute, a 
constitution, or a treaty will forever hold as the correct reading. In fact the 
converse is true because the law develops only when legal materials are 
subjected to continuing analyses. Different factual, political, and historical 
contexts sometimes yield new interpretations.113
Secondly, teleological interpretation involves a privileging of the 
correct  reading,  over  other  possible  readings.  Among  the  so-called 
misreadings  lie  some readings  that  have  flaws  in  their  legal  reasoning. 
Correctly, these should not see the light of day. Nonetheless, some of the 
so-called misreadings are in fact not misreadings. A deconstruction of the 
process of privileging correct readings over misreadings may show this to 
be  the  case.  Culler’s  deconstruction  of  reading  and  misreading  is  quite 
instructive. He writes that: 
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When  one  attempts  to  formulate  the  distinction  between  reading  and 
misreading,  one  inevitably  relies  on  some  notion  of  identity  and 
difference.  Reading and understanding preserve or reproduce a content or 
meaning,  maintain its  identity,  while  misunderstanding and misreading 
distort it; they produce or introduce a difference.  It can be argued that the 
transformation  or  modification  of  meaning  that  characterises 
misunderstanding  is  also  at  work  in  what  we  routinely  refer  to  as 
understanding.  If  a  text  can  be  understood,  it  can  in  principle  be 
understood  repeatedly,  by  different  readers  in  different  circumstances. 
These acts of reading or understanding are not, of course, identical. They 
involve modifications and differences, but differences which are deemed 
not  to  matter.   We can thus  say,  in  a  formulation more valid  than its 
converse,  that  understanding  is  a  special  case  of  misunderstanding,  a 
particular  deviation  or  determination  of  misunderstanding.  It  is 
misunderstanding  whose  misses  do  not  matter.   The  interpretative 
operations at work in a generalised misunderstanding or misreading give 
rise  both  to  what  we  call  understanding  and  to  what  we  call 
misunderstanding. The claim that all readings are misreadings can also be 
justified by the most familiar aspects of critical and interpretative practice. 
Given  the  complexities  of  texts,  the  reversibility  of  tropes,  the 
extendibility  of  context,  and  the  necessity  for  a  reading  to  select  and 
organise, every reading can be shown to be partial.  Interpreters are able 
to discover features and implications of a text that previous interpreters 
neglected  or  distorted.   They  can  use  the  text  to  show that  previous 
readings are in fact  misreadings,  but  their  own readings will  be found 
wanting  by  later  interpreters,  who  may  astutely  identify  the  dubious 
presuppositions  or  particular  forms  of  blindness  to  which  they  testify. 
The history of readings is a history of misreadings, though under certain 
circumstances these misreadings can be and may have been accepted as 
readings.114
This quotation illustrates that there is a sense in which all readings of legal 
texts are in fact misreadings. Yet for their legitimacy, legal systems depend 
on that mechanism inculcated in them to distinguish between readings from 
misreadings. Is this in fact not where many of the problems affecting the 
creative processes of our legal systems come from? Perhaps an admission 
of  this  problem  would  unravel  more  problems  than  most  people  are 
prepared  to  attend  at  the  moment.  An  admission  that  all  reading  is 
misreading, and that  the other is as important as its enthroned opposite, 
might threaten the notions of meaning, value, and authority promoted by 
our institutions.
 
Each reader’s  reading would be as  valid  or  legitimate  as  another,  and 
neither teachers nor texts could preserve their wonted authority.  What 
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such  inversions  do,  though,  is  displace  the  question,  leading  one  to 
consider  what  are  the  processes  of  legitimisation,  validation,  or 
authorisation  that  produce  differences  among  readings  and  to  expose 
another as a misreading.  In the same way, identification of the normal as 
a special case of the deviant helps one to question the institutional forces 
and  practices  that  institute  the  normal  by  marking  or  excluding  the 
deviant.  In  general,  inversions  of  hierarchical  oppositions  expose  to 
debate the institutional arrangements that rely on the hierarchies and thus 
open possibilities of change-possibilities which may well come to little 
but which may also at some point prove critical.115
These concerns leave untouched the violence exhibited in the process of 
justifying the enthroned reading as the only possible correct reading of a 
text. Our readings of legal texts are always partial in that they represent 
only  some  aspects  of  the  meaning  of  texts,  and  also  because  they  are 
interpretations that benefit the position we advocate. It must follow from 
this therefore that our justifications for privileging one reading as correct, 
and other possible readings as misreadings are not always consistent. There 
is therefore a sense in which the process of privileging one idea as correct, 
and disregarding all the other possible readings as misreadings is legalistic 
in nature. In the end, it is the process by which legal doctrine is formulated. 
This  process  sows the  seeds  of  its  own perpetuation  in  the  doctrines  it 
creates - the very doctrines we later rely on to establish that rule of law 
which we are always seeking to establish. In the end, this process hedges 
itself in, precluding its own criticism. No wonder that when these doctrines 
of law are threatened, we are almost mechanically inclined to believe that 
solutions to the problem(s) lie within the context we already have, and not 
outside that context, privileging the already privileged idea, and hoping that 
we get it right. There appears to be an inclination in us, when the insecurity 
of privileged ideas starts to show, to supplement them in order to sustain 
them without asking whether this emerging insecurity is justified by the 
philosophy of foundationalism that sponsored the ideas in the first place. If 
we  have  inclined  ourselves  habitually  to  the  violence  of  uncritical 
foundationalism,  we  appear  also  to  be  only  too  eager  to  reject  any 
suggestion that uncritical foundationalism may be a curse. As Johnson has 
observed, “The chains of habit are too weak to be felt until they are too 
strong to be broken”.116
Summary
The deconstructionist  problematic117 can be summed up in the following 
way.  Intimacy with systems of thought  which limit  our imagination has 
Deconstructionism, Normative Theory and Custom  144
resulted  in  our  adoption  of  the  same  systems  not  as  systems  of 
confinement, but as the very essence of being human. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that  the most recognised deconstructionists  are almost always 
described  as  being  “wilfully  anti-systematic”.118  Familiarity  with 
foundationalism  has  created  an  acceptance  of  it  akin  to  unquestioning 
religious  adherence  and  dependence.  Thus,  investigations  into  problems 
and  their  solutions  are  almost  always  unwittingly  premised  on 
foundationalist  perspectives,  and  foundationalist  definitions,  and 
foundationalist  processes.  The  result  is  always  a  narrowing  of  the 
knowledge we would otherwise gain from a more open examination of 
issues.  Deconstruction  is  an  attempt  at  breaking  away from the  violent 
cycle of diminishing knowledge by foundationalising ideas at the cost of 
their  sacrificed  others whose existence is  revealed by their  trace in  the 
privileged ideas. Deconstruction emphasises the need for a philosophical 
interrogation of the systems and doctrines that we apply to create processes 
and  systems  on  which  we  order  our  lives.  Deconstruction  strongly 
emphasises that: 
1) writing precedes speech, instead of operating as a mere supplement to 
it,119
2) every text refers to other texts,120
3) because an idea, and the form that expresses it are not congruent, texts 
are always fused with disparities between what the author of the text 
means to say, and what the text is nonetheless constrained to mean,121
4) every  writing  embodies  a  failed  attempt  at  reconciling  identity  and 
difference, unity and diversity and self and other,
5) even  writings  that  give  the  impression  that  they  have  realised  the 
desired  reconciliation  are  nothing  more  than  another  distortion  and 
suppression of difference and subordination of the other,122
6) all meaning depends on a future rewriting of past writings as rewritten 
in the present writing which confronts the  interpreter,123 and that,
7) “a  present  writing  is  both  a  completion  and  an  erasure  of  the  past 
writing, and a text which must face erasure and completion by some 
future writing in order to acquire meaning”.124 
By  writing,  Derrida  means  the  system  of  representation  that  makes 
communication possible,  not  just  what  we normally mean by writing,  a 
system of  graphic  signs  with  something  like  a  recognisable  alphabet.125 
Derrida writes that, “… the genealogical relation and social classification 
are the stitched seam of arche-writing”.126 From these postulations, it seems 
either  that  the  challenge  deconstruction  poses  to  legal  interpretation  is 
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insurmountable, or that deconstruction is not suited to an analysis of the 
process of adjudication.  Fiss describes adjudication as “… a process by 
which  a  judge  comes  to  understand  and  express  the  meaning  of  an 
authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text”.127 This is a 
dynamic process. The interaction between the text and the reader produces 
“a meaning” which reflects both the subjective and objective elements of 
human existence and experience.128 Nonetheless, to shut out deconstruction 
from adjudication would condemn it  to  the  violence of  foundationalism 
whose present state has been described by some as being: “ … mired in a 
deep and persistent crisis”.129 It  would privilege foundationalism over all 
else. This does not seem desirable not least because the roots of most of the 
confusion  observable  in  legal  theory  today  owe  their  existence  to 
foundationalist  philosophy.  It  is  also  true  that  many  of  the  challenges 
confronting  governments  today  demand  universal  rather  than  national 
responses. For this reason, even domestic legal discourse is ferment with 
universalistic aspirations. If these aspirations are to be of any significance, 
the  international  legal  system  itself  must  exhibit  through  its  doctrines, 
legitimacy that inspires confidence that these international aspirations can 
actually  be  realised.  This  legitimacy  can  be  achieved  by  ridding  the 
doctrines  of  the  international  legal  system of  distortions  resembling  the 
violence  of  the  philosophy  of  foundationalism.  Besides,  there  is  no 
justification for shielding the doctrine of customary international law from 
deconstruction. Fiss argues that because the adjudication process brought 
together both the subjective and the objective elements, it is the successful 
reconciliation of the two through deconstruction that will “… deepen our 
understanding  of  law,  and  in  fact  might  even  suggest  how  law  is 
possible”.130 
It  is  worth  noting  also  that  there  are  no  easy  solutions  to  the 
challenge  deconstruction  poses  to  legal  interpretation.  On  its  own,  this 
should  not  be  accepted  as  sufficient  justification  for  not  asking  about 
customary international  law the  questions  deconstruction raises.  Perhaps 
deconstruction’s greatest benefit to this study is that it might confirm the 
genuine nature of the crisis affecting legal interpretation and, to be precise, 
the  reason  why there  is  a  loss  of  faith131 concerning  the  availability  of 
objective  criteria  permitting  the  ascription  of  distinct  and  transparent 
meanings of customary international law.132 This on its own is a necessary 
first step to understanding customary international law.
The simple jurisprudence of “original intent” that suggests that the 
meaning of legal texts can be ascertained by referring to some “transparent, 
self-present” intent of the author of the text seems incapable of addressing 
these challenges because even divinely prescribed law involves multiple 
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writings,  erasure,  and  inter-subjective  collaboration.  Resort  to  the 
jurisprudence of original intent can only lead to idolatry that forecloses any 
genuine inter-textual elucidation of legal relationships.133 Neither does the 
theory of inter-subjective perspective of interpretation meet the challenges 
posed by deconstruction. According to this theory, the legitimacy of any 
doctrine of law depends on the idea of an interpretative community that 
recognises  the  norms  of  that  particular  doctrine  as  being  valid.134 The 
existence  of  such  a  monolithic  community  can  only  be  illusory.135  Its 
existence,  if  it  ever  existed,  would  only  serve  to  signal  the  violence 
instituted by foundationalism, where the suppression of difference and the 
subordination of the dissenting other would have prevailed. Nor would a 
theory  of  legal  interpretation  that  included  extra-legal  values  meet  the 
challenges  posed  by  deconstruction.  A  good  illustration  of  such  an 
approach is afforded by Posner’s wealth maximisation principle.136 At the 
risk of  over-simplification,  the wealth  maximisation principle  holds  that 
legal rules should be interpreted so as to enhance the creation of wealth in 
society. If this were to be accepted as the appropriate way to interpret legal 
doctrines and the norms they created, it would still not meet the challenges 
posed by deconstruction precisely because of its basic assumption that the 
sole  purpose of  law is  to create wealth.  This assumption does not  hold 
universal  support.  Because  of  the  absence  of  consensus  on  this  basic 
premise, the law and economics theory of interpretation fails the test set by 
deconstruction that it should not ostracise part of the community of legal 
actors that did not subscribe to its principal assumption.137 In Dworkin’s 
“Law’s Empire”, Rosenfield138 sees an interpretative technique that nearly 
meets the challenges posed to legal interpretation theory by deconstruction. 
Dworkin’s approach focuses on “the process” of interpretation rather than 
the  object  of  interpretation  or  the  substantive  values  espoused  by  the 
interpreter.  Its  main  argument  is  that,  “Provided  that  legitimate 
interpretative procedures are followed, the interpretative outcome will be 
justified  regardless  of  actual  substantive  disagreements  concerning  the 
object of interpretation or extra-legal values held by the community of legal 
actors”.139 Nonetheless, Dworkin’s theory succumbs to the foundationalist 
vice of privileging one set of contested values over another.140 
Customary International Law and Deconstructionist Critique
The link between deconstruction and language has been proven. To apply 
deconstructionism to the search for a deconstructionist theory of custom, 
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we may need to show the link in general between deconstructionism and 
normative theory. To borrow from Frost: 
We engage in normative theory when we embark on the difficult task of 
explaining  the  meaning  of  establishing  the  relationships  which  hold 
between, and striving to evaluate different comprehensive patterns of core 
normative  concepts  such  as  liberty,  equality,  justice,  human  rights, 
political obligation, sovereignty, group rights, self determination, property 
rights, restitution, retribution, etc.141  
Normative theory pursues the meaning of each of these values. Even more, 
it seeks to understand the interconnectedness between each of these values. 
For instance, the question what is liberty, is followed by the question, what 
is  the  relationship  between  liberty  and  equality?  Are  they  mutually 
exclusive  or  mutually  supportive? Do all  nations have the right  to  self-
determination?  How ought  wars  to  be  fought?  What  is  the  relationship 
between sovereignty and human rights? These are questions easier asked 
than answered. This underlines both the difficulty of engaging in normative 
theory, and the importance of that exercise. Its importance lies in the fact 
that the deductions of normative arguments have been, and continue to be 
relied upon as justifications and springboards for launching “… historic, 
sometimes  heroic,  and  often  tragic  deeds”142 by  both  nations  and 
individuals.  We remember  Hume for  his  theory  of  “moral  sentiments”, 
Kant for his theory of “categorical imperatives”, Hegel for his rejection of 
these first two, and for his propagation of the need for “self-knowledge” 
through rational,  ethical  and modern thinking as opposed to reliance on 
mythology.143  At the peak of their influence, each of these theories formed 
the  basis  on  which  one  nation  declared  war  against  another,  and  allies 
formed  to  defend  “just  causes”.  However,  with  time  they  were  each 
succeeded  or  replaced  by  other  theories,  which  were  also  eventually 
replaced by other yet “better” ones. We observe therefore a cyclic tendency 
in the grounding of knowledge. In this sense, whether we like it  or not, 
have noticed it or not, want to accept it or not, modern thought appears 
inherently anti-foundationalist. Yet in practice we try to rethink and try to 
reformulate the systems and doctrines that we apply to run our processes 
and systems as if foundationalism were the basis of everything. To that end, 
traditional normative theory is defined by an unquestioning acceptance of 
the foundationalist model.144 The difficulty with this situation is primarily 
threefold. 
First, the consequences of this model have been questionable, and 
continue  to  attract  discussion.145 Second,  many  developments  in  the 
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international legal system have undermined the premises that still form the 
basis of doctrines that create substantive norms. Third, all legal systems tell 
their own story.146 To that end, all legal systems are  signifiers.  If a legal 
system  signifies a community’s way of life, it cannot be denied that that 
way  of  life  signifies values  and  assumptions  about  human  life  that  are 
rooted in particular philosophies about the function of being human. Some 
of  these  philosophies  as  we  have  already  seen  are  encumbered  with 
violence which when harnessed to legal force, induce in both law creation 
and law application violence which rejects the existence of otherness. Most 
of these philosophies are not themselves accurate descriptors of the ideas 
that they purport to represent, so that if  we uncritically rely on them to 
appraise the contexts of law creation and law application, we risk confusion 
instead  of  order.  We  can  never  hope  to  understand  our  reality  in 
circumstances where the lenses through which we seek to see that reality 
(philosophy)  are  warped,  and  the  tools  with  which  we  interrogate  that 
reality  (doctrines  based  on  uncritical  foundationalist  philosophy)  are 
equally warped.
The answer to the question whether deconstructionist  critique is 
relevant also to an analysis of normative theory, and to international law in 
particular can only be in the positive. To rid custom of its legitimacy deficit 
attempts must be made to undo the violence that foundationalist philosophy 
has  induced  and  continues  to  perpetuate  in  the  doctrine.  This  can  be 
achieved  it  seems  by  reconciling  the  foundationalised  idea  with  its 
ostracised  other.  Deconstruction  seems,  therefore,  to  set  the  conditions 
conducive  to  the  creation  of  a  system  of  norms  whose  law-creating 
processes  achieve  the  target  of  interpretation  required  of  them.  In  this 
sense,  deconstruction  seems  to  emphasise  the  Hegelian  aspiration  to 
reciprocal  symmetry  and  mutual  co-determination147 as  a  prerequisite  to 
legitimating ideas. This can only happen when deliberate responsibility for 
the  signature  of  the  other  is  brought  into  the  equation  of  customary 
international law. Deconstruction makes this possible because it tests our 
own ability to exercise our openness to and tenderness toward otherness. It 
demands  that  we  seek  to  internalise  toward  otherness  the  attitude  that 
shines  through  the  cracks  and  the  crevices  of  negative  dialectics.  It 
demands  that  our  ethical  vision  rests  on  expansiveness  rather  than  on 
constriction. To borrow from George and Campbell:
Since  we  cannot  be  sure  of  the  truth  of  anything,  including  the 
appropriateness  of  Western  Values,  we  need  to  adopt  a  new Socratic 
spirit,  combining  a  genuine  humility  before  knowledge  with  a  critical 
attitude that accepts no givens, takes nothing for granted, acknowledges 
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nothing  axiomatically,  questions  all  presuppositions,  challenges  all 
arbitrarily imposed boundaries and always asks why?148
Deconstruction  offers  that  rare  opportunity  of  seeking  to  understand 
customary international law not from the perspective of the arrogant expert 
armed with the life-giving stethoscope, but from the humble, knowledge-
seeking pupil’s  perspective.  The haste  with which many149 have tried to 
point us out of the confusion abiding in custom seems to have among other 
things  exposed  our  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  defects  inherent  in  the 
foundationalist  philosophy  that  we  rely  on  to  formulate  concepts  as 
fundamental  as  customary  international  law is  to  the  international  legal 
system. It also seems that these limitations, whose origin lies in the violent 
culture  of  ostracising  otherness  -  a  ritual  evident  in  the  writings  of 
generations of judges, practitioners, and scholars alike - has become our 
second nature. 
In  Plato's  Pharmacy,  Derrida  uncovers  the  tragic  origins  of 
philosophy in the fearful symmetry between logos and its rival model and 
obstacle in whose expulsion logos originates. Rene writes that, “Philosophy 
like  tragedy,  can  at  certain  levels  serve  as  an  attempt  at  expulsion,  an 
attempt perpetually renewed because it is never wholly successful”.150 This 
desire  to  muzzle  and  exclude contradiction sits  at  the  heart  of  Western 
philosophy, which also happens to be the bedrock for many established 
disciplines, including law. In  Dissemination, Derrida shows that madness 
has undergone a process of exclusion, silencing and internment in Western 
culture. In seventeenth century France, “le grand enternment” meant that 
mad people were rounded up and placed in newly organised asylums.151 In 
their  writings,  philosophers  of  the  time,  notably  Descartes,  completely 
ignored the subject of madness. Derrida observes that at the time, juridical 
language scarcely masked the themes of sacrificial expulsion. “Madness is 
expelled,  rejected,  denounced  in  its  very  impossibility  from  the  very 
inferiority  of  thought  itself”.152 McKenna  observes  a  complicity  by  the 
rational, and the political orders to silence and capture madness through an 
institutional discourse that presumed to objectify it.153 The dynamics of this 
process were buttressed not just by philosophy, but also by professional 
psychiatry.154 
Derrida  argues  that  a  similar  exclusionary  mechanism  that 
mystifies reality so that those ideas that are held exist exclusively at the 
expense of their opposites is observable in what is accepted as logic today. 
He calls this practice logocentric bias.155 What for instance is the opposite of 
customary  international  law?  What  traces  of  that  opposite  remain  in 
customary international law? When does or should customary international 
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law defer to its opposite, and when does/should it not, and why? Of what is 
customary international law a signifier? How much of that component can 
we trace in State practice, and how much in  opinio juris? Derrida’s chief 
criticism  of  Western  philosophy  is  that  it  is  incomplete  because  by 
foundationalising ideas, it disregards everything else contrary or near to the 
foundationalised idea.156 Benjamin157 sets out the arguments why such legal 
violence should not be tolerated. He also exposes the complicity of natural 
law and positive law to gloss over this  violence. He argues that although 
each of them distinguishes between the types of violence, albeit in different 
ways,  each does so with a view to justifying  legal  violence,  or  at  least 
certain types of  legal violence,  rather than criticising  legal violence.  For 
natural law, a criteria of ends - the just and the unjust - forecloses a critique 
of  violence per  se,  precisely  because  this  criteria  does  not  permit 
problematisation of the use of just but also  violent legal force to achieve 
just  ends.  While  positive  law thematises  legal  violence by  analysing  it 
without  reference  to  the  justice  of  its  ends,  it  retains  the  essential 
characteristics  of  the  violent  exercise in  question.  Positive  law  merely 
labels violence either as legitimate violence, or illegitimate violence without 
creating the basis for problematising the violence that it describes or labels 
as legitimate. “Natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to “justify” 
the means,  positive law to “guarantee” the justness of the ends through 
justification of the means.”158  For this  reason, Benjamin159 argues that a 
critique  of  legal  violence  must  commence  outside  both  positive  legal 
philosophy, and natural law. Only this way can law-founding violence and 
law-preserving violence be exposed, and the problems they create for legal 
imagination brought  to  the  fore.  Law-founding violence is  the  historical 
violence which substitutes a new grundnorm for an old one, as happens in 
revolutions, etc.  Law preserving violence is that violence that results from 
all the efforts to promote, protect, and enforce the new grundnorm founded 
by law-founding violence. Examples of this include judicial enforcement of 
contracts, and the punishment of those that offend the new code of law. 
Wolcher writes that:
Whatever it is that is founded by  law-making violence does not deserve 
the name “law” until the moment it is founded. However, at that precise 
moment, if there is one, the violence that founds it ceases to deserve the 
name “founding”,  and instead passes  over  into  violence that  preserves 
what has already been founded. (... see evidence of this in history, in the 
tendency of successful revolutions to ratify the violence that brought them 
success by retroactively declaring it justified, if not legal.) On the other 
hand, law-preserving violence, for its part, does not preserve anything that 
deserves the name “law” until what it preserves has already been founded. 
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...  Law-founding violence and  law-preserving violence always name the 
same thing - the distinction collapses in the recognition that they are both 
kinds of violence.160
There is therefore, a sense in which deconstruction can be described as an 
attempt to undo the violence that sits at the heart of ideas created through 
foundationalist  philosophy.  One  of  the  effects  this  violence has  is  that 
sometimes  the  ideas  created  and  circulated  are  very  difficult  to 
comprehend.  Sometimes  they  are  very  difficult  to  apply  consistently. 
Deconstruction traces problems with any norm of law backwards to the 
process by which it was created or established. Instead of regarding the law 
as a standard for what is possible among human beings, given their human 
nature,161 deconstructionist critique upholds that:
Our social vision and system of laws are not based upon human nature as 
it really is, but rather upon an interpretation of human nature, a metaphor, 
a privileging. We do not experience the “presence” of human nature; we 
experience different versions of it in the stories we tell about what we are 
“really like”. These stories are incomplete; they are metaphors and can be 
deconstructed.  Too  often  we  forget  that  our  systems  are  based  upon 
metaphor and interpretation; we mistake the dominant or privileged vision 
of people and society for real “present” human nature 162
In this sense, deconstruction enables a reconsideration of the meaning of a 
doctrine  when  we  remove  from  its  secondary  rules  of  recognition  the 
privileging that enabled their  foundationalisation so that  we then seek a 
new  understanding  of  the  doctrine  from  a  reconciliation  of  the  once 
privileged rules and their other opposites. Does the confusion surrounding 
customary international law stem from a suppression of those attributes of 
customary international law traceable in its secondary rules of recognition, 
which  the  authors  of  article  38(1)(b)  had  consciously  or  unconsciously 
muzzled and excluded from the doctrine altogether, or does that confusion 
originate from the inconsistency that occurs when international tribunals 
adduce as evidence of the emergence of  rules of customary international 
law,  inferences   of  the  privileged  idea  from traces  of  its  more  evident 
rejected other? While it cannot be guaranteed that immediate answers can 
be found to these questions, asking them is itself a necessary first step to 
addressing  the  challenges  posed  by  a  known  problem.  No  attempt  to 
address any such challenges, no matter how small, is irrelevant because its 
value may lie in subtracting from the number of possibilities left to explore 
in order to resolve the problem. 
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The central question for this study is whether the suggestion that 
rules of customary international law result from State practice coupled with 
opinio juris is sound given that numerous claims have been made about the 
need to abandon altogether163  customary international law as a source of 
international law. For this reason, it is necessary at this point of the study to 
suspend this hypothesis of customary international law so that from a fine 
combing of international tribunals’ jurisprudence on custom, the meaning 
of article 38(1)(b) can be discerned. Following that, a more comprehensive 
description  of  customary  international  law  will  then  be  attempted.  But 
before  we  proceed,  a  word  must  be  said  about  the  weaknesses  of 
deconstructionism.
Criticism of Deconstruction
Critiques  of  deconstruction  appear  united  that  its  usefulness  is  limited 
because ultimately, society requires somewhere to start off from, a common 
ground  which  deconstruction  appears  to  negate.164 This  is  a 
misunderstanding of deconstruction because deconstruction is not unethical 
in its approach. Its opposition is to the ethics of uncritical foundationalism 
that  appear  to  legitimate  the  violence  inherent  in  the  process  of  law 
creation. Deconstruction does not suggest that it is possible to have law 
without violence. Indeed even the most benevolent legal decision is violent 
in that it posits an outcome. In this sense, the ethics of deconstruction do 
not reflect an entirely anti-structuralist ethos. Rather, they advocate a more 
inclusive system of thought and knowledge gathering and application. 
On these terms, a foundation is the inescapable set of values and 
limitations that structure human interaction. Saurette argues that this, above 
all else, is the message of Nietzschean and Foucauldian genealogies that 
underline  the  historically  constructed  nature  of  all  perspectives.165  He 
writes that, “A society ... requires a foundation so that it can temporarily 
forget the ungroundable nature of judgment and affirm action and life in 
spite  of  the  ‘throwness’  of  being  and  arbitrariness  of  existence”.166 
Nietzsche  buttresses  this  argument  by  demonstrating  that  whether  we 
believe it  or not,  the act  of  forgetting is  actually an active and positive 
faculty of repression. He  writes that:
To close the doors and windows of consciousness for a time; to remain 
undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs 
working with and against one another; a little quietness, a little  tabula 
rasa of the subconsciousness, to make room for new things ... that is the 
purpose of active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of 
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psychic order, repose and etiquette: it is immediately obvious how there 
could be no happiness,  no cheerfulness,  no hope,  no pride,  no present 
without forgetfulness. The man in whom this apparatus of repression is 
damaged  and  ceases  to  function  properly  may  be  compared  with  the 
dyspeptic - he cannot “have done” with anything. [Yet] ... the very life 
that  requires  forgetfulness  demands  the  temporary  suspension  of  this 
forgetfulness;  this  is  when  it  is  supposed  to  become  absolutely  clear 
precisely  how  unjust  the  existence  of  certain  things  -  for  example,  a 
privilege,  a  caste  or  a  dynasty -  really is,  and how much these things 
deserve to be destroyed. This is when its past is viewed critically, when 
we take a knife to its roots.167
By emphasising deconstruction’s call to destabilise foundations on the one 
hand, and ignoring deconstruction’s fervent call for the need to reconcile 
the privileged idea with its ostracised other, opponents of deconstruction168 
expose  themselves  as  loyal  and  faithful  servants  of  uncritical 
foundationalism. Deconstruction is not only about the systematic unveiling 
of contradictions embedded in writing by fruitlessly inverting observable 
binary  oppositions.  Derrida  denies  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  self-
sufficient originary foundation for a system of thought because, ultimately, 
it  can  be  shown  that  the  same  foundational  terms  depend  upon  the 
subordinate terms we would like to think depend on them.169 Deconstruction 
therefore  challenges  the  commonly  held  view that  we  perceive  an  idea 
independently of its opposite. For example, that when one thinks of speech 
one  does  not  simultaneously  relate  one’s  thinking  to  writing.  In  Of 
Grammatology,  Derrida  argues  that,  “… when we hold  an  idea on  our 
minds, we hold both the idea and its opposite; we think not of speech, but 
of  speech  as  opposed  to  writing,  or  speech  with  traces  of  the  idea  of 
writing,  from  which  speech  differs,  and  upon  which  it  depends”.170 
Deconstruction neutralises  the  former  justifications  for  privileging  some 
ideas,  texts  or  concepts  over others,  compelling the  deconstructionist  to 
explain the basis for the way in which s/he orders his/her ideas or concepts. 
Such  a  task  can  yield  or  even  impose  the  discovery  of  new or  fresher 
insights into the subject matter. Nonetheless, any novel explanations would 
themselves not be immune to deconstruction, justifying perhaps the charge 
of  nihilism  that  its  opponents  like  to  use  against  it.  Does  this  make 
deconstruction  a  bottomless  pit,  with  no  foundation?  For  Derrida  that 
question points to the conditioning of Western foundationalist philosophy, 
of wanting to foundationalise everything. In  Of Grammatology, he argues 
that this is Western philosophy’s agenda, that:
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One  can  only  seek  truth  if  one  discovers  fundamental  principles  and 
builds  upon  them.  We  should  recognise  this  “agenda”  by  now  as 
privileging.  The  act  of  privileging  requires  the  privileged  term  to  be 
foundational, complete, self-sufficient; however, it is none of these things. 
It  is  related  to  the  non-privileged  term  in  a  system  of  mutual 
differentiation  and  dependence  or  defferance.  [But]  [t]he  privileged 
concept is incomplete; it is only a supplement, a signifier, a metaphor. For 
that reason we  are able to use it against itself, to deconstruct it. The act of 
privileging, of asserting that one of two mutually dependent concepts  is 
really foundational, is like drinking from the springs of the mythical river 
Lethe,  after  which  we  forget  our  past.  Once  we  have  accepted  the 
privileging, we forget our past. Once we have accepted the privileging, we 
forget that the foundational concept was only a metaphor, a supplement. 
Deconstruction awakes us from our dogmatic slumber,  and reminds us 
that our truth is only an interpretation.171
Nonetheless, critics of deconstruction insist that Derrida’s argument is not 
sufficient to answer to the charge of nihilism.172  However, it seems that 
such criticism ignores the facts of the history of knowledge. Such history 
awakens us to the reality that the strength of knowledge, indeed the reason 
it has remained so powerful throughout the ages, is precisely because of its 
ability  to  metaphorically  shade  its  skin,  when  the  previous  basis  of 
knowledge  was  succeeded  by  yet  another,  and  more  appropriate  basis, 
which  still  remained  open  to  criticism,  and  succession  by  yet  another. 
Brown173 illustrates this same point by conducting what he calls “before and 
after” comparisons of the ways in which thinkers of different  periods have 
set up their positions. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Kant’s 
inquiry into the nature of moral judgment, led him to believe that he had 
found a sufficient answer to David Hume’s scepticism by his principle of 
“categorical imperative”, claiming that the moral law is imbedded in the 
minds of all rational beings, and that its content is rational and unavoidable 
- a reversal of Hume’s position, perhaps. Nonetheless,  a few years later 
Hegel rejected Kant’s position. By historicising the notions of morality and 
rationality, he established a new position, namely that the emergence of the 
modern, ethical, rational state and the subjectively free private individual 
created a new self-knowledge which defied the myths of the self-realising 
spirit  invoked  by  Kant  to  justify  his  position  -  (a  reversal  of  Kant’s 
position).  Clearly,  knowledge’s protection from obsoleteness lies in part 
with the opportunities available to deconstruct previously held perceptions 
of the basis of knowledge. The clamour for a leveling off point shows on 
the one hand, a misunderstanding of the dynamic power of knowledge and 
on  the  other,  a  desire  to  kill  knowledge  by  bursting  the  bubble  that 
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perpetuates its power. There is therefore a sense in which the possibility of 
the  deconstruction  of  one  position  by  another,  and  so  on,  is  actually 
necessary for knowledge to remain as powerful as it has been over the ages. 
However, if the acceptance of deconstruction as one of the fitting tools of 
critical enquiry should be married to an identifiable levelling off point, such 
a  point  would  not  be  too  difficult  to  find  either,  though  of  course  its 
existence  would  only  be  relative  to  the  abiding  reconciliation  of  the 
formerly privileged idea  with its  other  idea.  The level  of  reconciliation 
achieved  by  any  one  deconstruction  exercise  becomes  the  power  that 
determines the achievement of that exercise. Rosenfield argues that at too 
high  a  level  of  reconciliation  “…  all  meanings  appear  to  be 
interchangeable, as every writing is grasped in its infinite regress along the 
opposite  directions  of  its  endless  past  and  its  perpetually  incomplete 
future”.174 At  too  low  a  level  of  reconciliation  “…  meanings  remain 
completely opaque as myopic concentration on the features of individual 
texts would tend to conceal or obscure the relationships between such texts 
and  other  texts”.175 Nonetheless,  a  proper  level  of  reconciliation  can  be 
reached by  “… grasping texts in their unfolding as part of the process of 
historical formation that gives shape to the ontology of postponement of the 
reconciliation of self and other and to the ethical call to the other renewed 
by each such postponement”.176
It seems therefore that the charge of nihilism is quite misplaced. 
Similarly, the charge that it is a denial of the existence of objective truth177 
is  best  understood as  a  reflection  of  two things.  One  is  the  success  of 
uncritical  foundationalist  conditioning  over  time,  and  the  second  is 
unjustified frustration with  Derrida’s thesis. 
 
Conclusion
In  this  chapter  two  tendencies  that  appear  to  hinder  the  normative 
legitimacy  of  custom  have  been  observed.  The  first  is  the  timid  and 
unquestioning acceptance of “givens” by judges, scholars and practitioners 
in  international  law.  Only  when  we  begin  to  ask  questions  about  the 
standards  that  masquerade  as  “unquestionable  law”  while  they  covertly 
structure the limits of our legal imagination, will we understand that these 
same standards are among the least “acceptable”, least benign, and perhaps 
least suited to serve us in the spheres that they operate. The second, which 
follows  from  the  first,  is  the  consequent  need  to  understand  norms  as 
hierarchical,  or  purely  foundational.  By  attempting  to  historicise  and 
destabilise the philosophical roots of normative theory a new and unfettered 
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understanding  of  the  doctrine  of  customary  international  law  can  be 
grasped. Once it becomes clear that our present understanding of customary 
international law is based on violence, and that the ghosts of this violence 
have now come to haunt custom, that understanding becomes unacceptable. 
For anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic 
philosophical foundations of our legal civilisation misconceives the origins 
of values which we might otherwise regard as intrinsic and natural to the 
legal processes and systems that we apply. 
The modern legal scholar has inherited so much material from his 
predecessors.  Deconstruction  provides  an  invaluable  tool  for  testing  the 
validity of what have often been passed down as “givens” in much of this 
inheritance.  First,  a  deconstructive  reading  can  show  how  arguments 
presented as the basis of a given rule not only undermine themselves, but 
also support an opposing view. Second, the process of deconstruction can 
reveal the effect on legal arguments of ideological thinking whose main 
function is to disguise the real issues at stake. Third, the application of this 
technique  enables  a  valuable  critique  of  conventional  interpretations  of 
legal texts.178 The value of deconstruction to a study intent on revitalising 
existing  institutions  cannot  be  overemphasised.  The  ideas  of  trace, 
differance, iterability and supplement shall be invoked in this study, with 
the aim of teasing out the content of customary international law from the 
decisions of international tribunals and then to compare that content with 
the requirements imposed on customary international law by its secondary 
rules  of  recognition.  This  exercise  should  facilitate  isolation  of  the 
problems  complained  about  customary  international  law,  and  reveal 
possible alternatives to the formulation of a more legitimate doctrine of 
custom.
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